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According to Toby Ord’s The Precipice, humanity is 
living through unprecedented times. There is a good 
chance that you’ve heard these exact words being (over)
used in recent months. Many think that they perfectly 
describe our current predicament of grappling with 
this century’s first global pandemic. But for Ord, these 
words echo the long story of humanity’s transition into 
times of peril as we continue to gain more and more 
power over shaping the future of our entire existence. 
And the reality of the ongoing pandemic is just one 
example of that. 
To understand why, consider the following facts. By 
now, the Covid-19 pandemic has reached all inhabited 
parts of the world, and the death toll has escalated to 
over a million and counting. Our societies are struggling 
to cope with the immediate consequences of this crisis. 
Lockdowns have brought personal and social life to a 
standstill, health care systems are crumbling under 
pressure, and tensions about potential global economic 
crises are on the rise. Simultaneously, we are also faced 
with the local and global impacts of climate change, 
exposed to the constant threat of totalitarian regimes 
taking over or a nuclear conflict breaking out, and are 
also vulnerable to several known and unknown risks 
posed by rapid and radical technological developments. 
In theory, it’s plausible that there are mechanisms by 
which the cumulative effects of these risks could have 
far-reaching consequences that are bringing humanity 
closer to what Ord refers to as “a crumbling ledge on 
the brink of a precipice”. 
Ord’s book, The Precipice, is a timely reminder that 
such mechanisms do exist and, in fact, they are up 
and running. The long history of humanity, which is 
marked by transitions from agricultural to scientific 
to industrial revolutions, has now brought us to a 
precipitous moment in which we are faced with a 
number of existential risks – risks that threaten the 
destruction of humanity’s long-term potential (more on 
this below) by, for example, causing the extinction of 
humanity or triggering a global collapse of civilization 
from which we cannot recover. Even if a global 
pandemic, by itself, may fail to extinguish humanity’s 
long-term future, our failure to avoid or prevent actions 
that may aid and abet the spread of natural or human-
engineered pandemics, combined with our failure 
to mitigate the above-mentioned risks can together 
bring about a permanent collapse of civilisation, if 
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not complete extinction. According to Ord, if humanity 
doesn’t get its act together, all it will take is a little push 
for us to fall over the edge of the precipice. And if we 
fall, it’s game over.  
To fathom the impact of existential risks if they 
materialised, consider the following grim picture that 
Derek Parfit paints for us in his now classic book Reasons 
and Persons (1984). Imagine that a nuclear war breaks 
out and kills 99 percent of the world’s population and 
leaves the remaining civilisation in a dark age that could 
last centuries. Contrast this scenario with a second one 
wherein a nuclear war kills a full 100 percent of the 
world’s population. Intuitively, the second war seems 
far worse than the first – not just quantitatively but also 
qualitatively. Although both wars kill billions and billions 
of people and destroy our present, the second war wipes 
out humanity entirely and therefore destroys our future. 
Existential risks, if left ignored, hold out the promise of 
ensuring that humanity ends up in the second scenario.
***
The idea of humanity going extinct or simply getting 
locked in a bleak dystopian scenario from which it fails 
to recover is deeply frightening. Intuitively, it seems 
that it would be terrible if we allowed this to happen 
one way or the other, either knowingly or unknowingly. 
But why exactly would it be bad? Some philosophers 
think that extinction would be bad because it would 
cause people to suffer painful deaths and psychological 
harms. But imagine an extinction scenario in which 
humanity goes out of existence quietly and painlessly. 
Is there still something wrong about causing or allowing 
our extinction this way? We need to explore other 
reasons. Ord offers us a couple, ranging from appeals 
to the instrumental value of humanity, to our cosmic 
significance stemming from our unique capabilities 
and to what he calls humanity’s “civilisational virtues”. 
But Ord’s chief reason is grounded in the value of 
humanity’s future, or, in other words, humanity’s long-
term potential. As he puts it: 
Human extinction would foreclose our future. It 
would destroy our potential. It would eliminate 
all possibilities but one: a world bereft of human 
flourishing. Extinction would bring about this failed 
world and lock it in forever – there would be no 
coming back.
But what actually is humanity’s potential? For Ord, our 
potential lies in what humanity can achieve through 
the combined actions of each and every human, and 
perhaps even those trans-humans who may one day 
replace us. The scope of this potential knows no bounds. 
Ord devotes the final chapter of his book to spelling 
out why this is so. Think of the trillions of human lives 
that can still be lived, the vast amount of knowledge 
we are yet to produce, the technological heights we are 
yet to reach, the scientific breakthroughs that are yet 
to happen, and the many intergalactic space missions 
we are yet to undertake. Accordingly, what makes the 
materialisation of existential risks uniquely morally 
significant is the permanent loss of the vast range of 
possible futures that remain open to us.
WHAT MAKES THE 
MATERIALISATION OF 
EXISTENTIAL RISKS UNIQUELY 
MORALLY SIGNIFICANT IS THE 
PERMANENT LOSS OF THE VAST 
RANGE OF POSSIBLE FUTURES 
THAT REMAIN OPEN TO US
If we follow Ord’s understanding of humanity’s 
long-term potential as being defined by the set of 
all possible futures that remain open to us, then, 
presumably, some of the possible futures in this set 
also include ones that involve many years of mass 
suffering and pain, genocides, wars, and all other kinds 
of imaginable futures which seem objectively bad. 
So if it is the loss of humanity’s expansive potential, 
constituted by both prosperous futures as well as 
dystopian ones, that grounds the unique badness of 
humanity’s extinction, then we end up with the odd 
claim that extinction is bad not only because of loss 
of futures with astonishing value, but also ones with 
astonishing disvalue. However, we can easily fix this in 
at least two ways:
1) By restricting our definition of humanity’s 
potential to include only all good possible 
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futures, however we choose to understand what 
“good” futures are.
2) By reframing Ord’s claim as follows: that the 
badness of extinction risk materialising is 
grounded in the loss of humanity’s particular 
kind of long-term future, one that involves 
fulfilling our positive potential.
But why should we think in terms of humanity’s 
potential in the first place? Ord asks us to think of an 
analogy with a human’s life, an idea that is similar to 
what George Kavka proposes in his 1978 essay “The 
Futurity Problem”, in which he highlights the parallels 
between the narrative structure of our species’ history 
and that of an individual life. The structure of an 
ordinary human life constitutes different stages, 
including childhood, youth, adolescence and finally 
old age. Our childhood and youth mark the beginning 
of our life during which we learn and grow; and 
then we slowly progress towards adulthood during 
which we fulfil our potential and accomplish various 
personal goals before finally reaching the resting stage 
of old age. 
According to Ord, humanity’s life story has a similar 
structure. From the perspective of a geological 
timescale, Ord claims that humanity is still very much 
in its infancy. As he explains: 
On the timescale of an individual human life, our 
200,000-year history seems almost incomprehensibly 
long. But on a geological timescale, it is short, and 
vanishingly so on the timescale of the universe as a 
whole. Our cosmos has a 14-billion-year history and 
even that is short on the grandest scales. Trillions of 
years lie ahead of us.
Just as many seem to find the premature death of an 
individual horrific, cutting short humanity’s future 
before it can achieve its long-term potential strikes 
Ord, and many others, as comparably bad, or perhaps 
even worse. 
Drawing a comparison between humanity’s life 
narrative and the narrative of an ordinary human life 
might seem appealing at first, but not everyone finds 
this convincing. Philosophers like James Lenman doubt 
whether such an analogy holds any water. Lenman’s 
position on the matter is roughly as follows: 
1) He doubts whether there is some kind of grand 
philosophical vision of human history that is 
goal-oriented in a way that it would be tragic if 
we fail to attain this goal
2) He thinks that the tragedy of an individual’s 
premature death has no obvious analogue in the 
career of our species as a whole. For if humanity 
exists for another million year, then today 
would seem to be humanity’s childhood. But if 
humanity ceases to exist tomorrow, then today 
would seem to be humanity’s old age. 
Ord does not give us an argument for why exactly 
humanity’s life-story mirrors that of a human life, nor 
does he address Lenman’s claims directly, but I imagine 
that he could respond as follows. To Lenman’s first 
point, Ord may reiterate that humanity’s life-story 
does have a goal, and that goal is to achieve its full 
potential. To Lenman’s second point, Ord may contend 
that because humanity has this goal, and because on a 
geological time-scale we are still very young, extinction 
of humanity tomorrow would be akin to the premature 
death of an infant whose life was once full of potential. 
But even if we manage to deflect the objection that 
the analogy doesn’t work, one may still question 
how watertight this goal-oriented talk is. Thinking 
of the value of mitigating existential risks from the 
perspective of achieving humanity’s goal (reaching 
its full potential) seems to be motivated by the idea 
that humanity has an “end-stage” such that there will 
be a time when that end-stage will be reached. But 
unless Ord is assuming that humanity’s extinction is 
imminent, as many moral philosophers do, and that 
it’s an end-stage we cannot avoid, how else are we to 
make sense of what happens once we reach this point? 
Can we then say that humanity’s extinction might 
perhaps not be morally bad, even though it might be 
regrettable? More importantly, how and when exactly 
do we establish that humanity has indeed fulfilled this 
potential? Or how do we establish that we haven’t 
already done so? 
***
We needn’t settle on any definitive answers for now, 
as the idea that we must protect humanity’s long-
term future from existential risks can still get off 
the ground without establishing whether or not 
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humanity’s story has a narrative structure of the 
sort that Ord posits. What I find more intriguing is 
a different suggestion that Ord offers us for making 
sense of humanity’s potential: thinking of humanity 
as a group agent in itself. Imagine what humanity’s 
future could and should be like, and what decisions 
it would make, were it sufficiently rational and wise. 
Just as individual agents have potentials that they can 
choose to realise as they progress further in life, we 
can think of humanity as a group agent with certain 
character traits and dispositions that can realise its 
potential as it progresses further in time. With this line 
of thought, Ord sets the tone of the book’s discussion 
from the viewpoint of “humanity’s morality”, rather 
than morality from an individual’s perspective. As is 
well known, ethics is most commonly discussed from 
an individual’s viewpoint: what should I do? And only 
sometimes do we consider questions from a group’s 
viewpoint: what should a group do? But Ord suggests 
that we take a step further, and think about what 
matters most from the perspective of humanity: what is 
in its best interest, and so on.
THE IDEA OF CONCEIVING 
HUMANITY AS A GROUP AGENT 
IS AN INTERESTING ONE, BUT 
ALSO ONE THAT WARRANTS 
CAUTION
The idea of conceiving humanity as a group agent is an 
interesting one, but also one that warrants caution. It is 
not uncommon to think of large collectives like nations, 
organizations, or corporations as group agents who can 
be subject to demands of morality. However, it is not 
clear whether, and how, we can extend our ideas of 
what conditions suffice for group agency to humanity 
as well. Humanity – in an abstract and intuitive sense 
of the word – is a fragmented and disorganized body, 
spanning across times and distances that makes it hard 
to pin it down as one coherent agent. Moreover, in order 
to ascribe agency, humanity at least needs to exhibit a 
form of cohesion that resembles group behaviour or 
mimics decision-making capacities as a group, and not 
just a mere collection of individuals. We can say at 
least this much without necessarily committing to any 
particular account of group moral agency, for group-
level rational decision-making procedure is commonly 
accepted as a hallmark of group agency across the 
board. And humanity as a whole, as of now, seems to 
lack one. 
So perhaps what we should really be asking is 
whether and how humanity’s potential to become a 
group agent can be fulfilled, or what kinds of steps or 
actions humanity can take to become a group agent. 
These questions remain unanswered for now, but to 
Ord’s credit his discussion opens up a whole range of 
interesting ideas to consider. For instance, if we can 
ascribe group agency to humanity, then can it itself be 
held accountable if it fails to fulfil its own potential? 
Is it appropriate to speak of humanity’s having certain 
beliefs, desires, or intentions? Would humanity be a 
different kind of group agent if it included new kinds 
of moral agents, say AI robots, that may live millions 
years from now? And if so, what would this difference 
in kind amount to? 
These, then, are some of the key philosophical aspects 
of Ord’s discussion of existential risks. Moving onto the 
risks themselves, what are some of the most pressing 
existential risks that threaten humanity’s potential, 
and, more importantly, precisely how urgent are they 
and why?
***
In the second part of The Precipice, Ord examines 
the scientific underpinnings of different sources of 
existential risks, ranging from natural risks (such 
as those posed by asteroid collision and stellar 
explosions) to anthropogenic risks (such as climate 
change and nuclear wars), as well as novel future risks 
arising from radical technological developments in 
nanoscience and space exploration that we might face 
in centuries to come. Much of his discussion aims to 
clarify whether, why, and to what extent these and 
other sources of risks do in fact pose a real threat of 
humanity’s extinction. 
According to Ord, the total natural risks that arise from 
the threat of collision with asteroids that are bigger 
than ten kilometres in size, or similarly sized comets, 
as well as super-volcanic and stellar collisions, taken 
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altogether, are estimated to carry merely a 1 in 10,000 
chance of extinction in next 100 years. These estimates 
are based on studying fossil records of how long species 
similar to us survived, and thus extrapolating to the total 
extinction risk they faced. Ord deems the extinction 
risk from natural causes to be significant, yet fairly low 
in comparison to those risks posed by anthropogenic 
causes. But before turning to those, I want to briefly 
turn our attention to the following question: how can 
we tell if a natural phenomenon poses a real risk of our 
extinction or permanent collapse? 
HOW CAN WE TELL IF A 
NATURAL PHENOMENON 
POSES A REAL RISK OF OUR 
EXTINCTION OR PERMANENT 
COLLAPSE?
To illustrate what I mean, consider the following. It is 
clear why we would think that collision with an asteroid 
that is bigger than ten kilometres in size poses a real 
risk of extinction. The answer is simple: because in the 
last extinction event, as Ord highlights, “all land-based 
vertebrates weighing more than five kilograms were 
killed”. This counts as clear evidence that collisions with 
large asteroids do in fact pose a real risk of extinction: 
they have led to extinction in the past and might do so 
again in the future. But then consider what Ord has to 
say about the risk posed by the natural phenomenon of 
magnetic field shifting:
“[T]he Earth’s entire magnetic field can shift 
dramatically, and sometimes reverses its direction 
entirely. These shifts leave us more exposed to cosmic 
rays during the time it takes to reorient. However, 
this happens often enough that we can tell it isn’t an 
extinction risk (it has happened about 20 times in 
the 5 million years since humans and chimpanzees 
diverged). And since the only well-studied effects 
appear to be somewhat increased cancer rates, it is 
not a risk of civilization collapse either. 
One may wonder whether an event happening 20 times 
in 5 million years is infrequent enough to disregard 
the claim that it poses an extinction risk. But the 
frequency of a natural event cannot be the only factor 
that determines whether it poses an extinction risk. 
And simply referring to studies that trace the impact 
of this natural event on increased cancer rates does not 
negate the possibility that such events may still pose a 
risk of extinction, or risk of some other kind. 
My motivation behind raising these points is not to 
offer a definitive answer, but merely to point to the idea 
that it remains unclear how we should filter extinction-
triggering natural risks from the others. This is 
important for our aims of defining the boundaries of 
our natural existential risk landscape. The boundaries 
of our anthropogenic risk landscape, by contrast, are 
clearly very wide and stretchable. They seem to keep 
extending as humanity keeps its engine of technological 
innovation running. Amongst different sources of 
anthropogenic risks, Ord estimates the risk from 
engineered pandemics and what he calls “unaligned” 
artificial intelligence to be the most pressing risk of our 
times, estimating them to pose respectively at least a 
1 in 30 and a 1 in 10 chance of destroying humanity’s 
potential this century.  
Surprisingly, risks independently posed by climate 
change, natural pandemics, and nuclear wars that are 
commonly touted as harbingers of humanity’s ultimate 
end – in both fiction and non-fiction – turn out to be 
ones that are unlikely to push humanity to the edge of 
extinction, according to Ord’s estimations. Consider 
what he says about risks from nuclear wars: If a full-
scale nuclear war did break out, what would happen? 
Would it really threaten extinction or the permanent 
collapse of civilization? According to Ord, the threat 
to humanity would come from the global effects of 
nuclear war, rather than local effects. One such global 
effect involves covering of entire surface of the Earth 
with radioactive dust from nuclear weapons. However, 
in practice, Ord points out that this scenario would 
require ten times as many weapons as there are in 
humanity’s possession as of now. We can, he assures 
us, dismiss the claim that humanity has enough nuclear 
weapons to destroy itself as hyperbolic and untrue. 
Similarly, he contends that while climate change risks 
posed by extreme levels of warming are considered 
serious enough to cause “a global calamity of 
unprecedented scale”, it does not pose a direct existential 
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Will our future look like this?
risk to humanity. Notwithstanding the fact that other 
risks associated with climate change, such as risk of mass 
migration, environmental damage or mass starvation 
are extremely worrisome and problematic, Ord feels 
that the mechanisms through which climate change 
can cause our direct extinction or irrevocable damage, 
such as heat stress or runaway greenhouse effects, are 
unlikely to actualize in reality. Nevertheless, this is not 
to say that these risks are not important. They play a 
very significant role as risk factors, that is, in increasing 
the overall risk of global catastrophes, and leaving us 
more vulnerable to existential risks in the future. 
***
The more urgent and plausible existential risk (1 
in 10 this century), according to Ord, comes from 
expected growth in the development of artificial 
general intelligence (AGI). Ord notes that since its early 
days, our goals of developing AI abilities have become 
grander: from merely recognizing cats to developing 
agents with an artificial general intelligence that 
could potentially surpass our own abilities in almost 
every domain. Technical advances in deep learning, 
such as improved datasets, computing power, design 
and training of neural networks, have allowed AI 
researchers to achieve the former goal: neural networks 
can not only recognize cats and differentiate between 
different breeds, they can also outperform humans at 
games likes chess and Go. 
The latter goal of creating an artificial general 
intelligence that could potentially surpass our own 
remains a mere possibility. This possibility, however, 
is one that warrants our serious attention. Ord offers 
a number of reasons for this. For instance, sufficiently 
intelligent AGI systems could reach a stage where its 
behaviour is unpredictable and uncontrollable; it could 
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gain control of the Internet or escalate its power to 
the extent of improving its own intelligence levels far 
beyond our own; it could even acquire an instrumental 
goal of survival and succeed in blocking any of our 
attempts to shut it down. Although no current AI 
system can improve its own intelligence, develop new 
weapons technology, take over control or cripple the 
rest of humanity, if any of this were to become a reality, 
one immediate threat would be that humanity will lose 
all control of its own future.
It’s not clear exactly how an AGI system might seize 
control, but what is clear to Ord is that our potential 
loss of control over humanity’s long-term future poses 
a real existential risk in the following way: “In the 
act of creation, we would cede our status as the most 
intelligent entities on Earth. So without a very good 
plan to keep control, we should also expect to cede our 
status as the most powerful species, and the one that 
controls its own destiny”. In the scenario where we are 
succeeded by AGI, our future could potentially be at the 
mercy of a system that may or may not align its moral 
values with ours, that may allow for a decent outcome 
if we are lucky, or may leave us locked in a dystopian 
future forever. 
Ord admits that the case for existential risks resulting 
in our extinction or some existential catastrophe from 
AGI is rather speculative. But he also thinks that it’s 
reasonable that a speculative case for risks involving 
losing control over humanity’s future should raise 
our threshold of concern more than a robust case for 
extremely low probability existential risks that we face 
from, say, asteroid collisions. But one may ask: how 
reasonable is this concern?
In a recent review of Brian Smith’s The Promise of 
Artificial Intelligence, Tim Crane discusses how despite 
Or will it look like this?
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AI’s recent successes there is still very little reason 
to believe that it is ever likely to create genuine 
thinking machines – let alone machines that can one 
day get to the point of taking over control of our 
humanity. According to Crane, grand claims about the 
possibility of AGI – and everything that they might be 
able to achieve – ignore some significant differences 
between relatively well-defined domains where AI has 
historically succeeded and poorly-defined domains 
such as “general intelligence”. For instance, the former 
domains are characterised by goal-oriented tasks. 
Consider how machines are trained to play a game of 
Go or recognise speech. Both tasks come with their 
own set of clear, pre-defined rules and a goal that the 
machine tries to achieve. In the case of Go, the goal is 
to win the game and in the case of speech recognition, 
the goal is to recognise spoken words. 
It is not, however, remotely clear what the goal or 
target of “general intelligence” might be. How can 
we characterise, in abstract terms, the problem(s) 
that general intelligence tries to solve? Consider, for 
instance, the activity of conversing with someone. This 
could have a number of goals, from wanting to ask for 
information, to asking for help, to expressing one’s 
emotion, to ask for directions, and so on. But what is 
the overall goal of a conversation? According to Crane, 
there is no single goal. Conversation, as an activity, 
simply lacks the feature of having an easily expressible 
goal to which we direct our intelligence. The difficulty 
in defining a task or goal-oriented domain of general 
intelligence appears to undermine the plausibility of 
the idea that current successes in AI imply that AGI is a 
real possibility in the future.
HOW CAN WE CHARACTERISE, 
IN ABSTRACT TERMS, THE 
PROBLEMS THAT GENERAL 
INTELLIGENCE TRIES TO 
SOLVE?
Crane’s scepticism towards the possibility of genuine 
AGI may be warranted, but let’s assume for the sake of 
argument that there is a real possibility that humanity 
will one day succeed in creating AGI and consequently 
cede its status as the most intelligent entity. Even then, 
Ord’s worry that humanity may lose control of its 
future seems to be in tension with his otherwise very 
tolerant and inclusive view of expanding our moral 
community and welcoming “new kinds of moral agents 
in the future” within the category of humanity, if this 
is what it takes to further our aims of achieving our full 
potential. If we entertain the possibility that humanity 
as we know it now could be replaced by some new moral 
agents in the form of, say, powerful, super-intelligent 
AGI systems, who may potentially be far more capable 
of and motivated towards achieving the best possible 
future for humanity, then should we be willing to at 
least entertain this as a good possibility for furthering 
our interest? I’m not sure how much credence Ord 
would assign to this possibility, but it certainly raises 
a number of interesting questions. For instance: is our 
philosophical notion of humanity malleable enough 
to subsume AGIs as our descendants or flag-bearers 
or co-partners in the endeavour of reaching our full 
potential? Needless to say, the kinds of worries that 
Ord raises about AGI locking our future in a permanent 
Orwell-style enforced totalitarian regime (or worse) 
may easily tip the balance against it. 
***
Taking stock of these major existential risks, Ord 
offers his own best estimates of the total existential 
risks befalling this century. Combining his best 
estimates of each existential risk (and assuming 
some positive correlation between them) that 
reflects his overall impression of the risk landscape 
in light of scientific evidence, whilst also factoring in 
uncertainty and imprecision about these numbers, 
Ord places the overall existential risk in the next 100 
years to be: 1 in 6.
To get an intuitive sense of how low or high this 
probability is, compare it with Ord’s estimate of 
extinction or unrecoverable collapse of civilisation 
befalling humanity in the twentieth century: 1 in 100. 
By comparison, a 1 in 6 chance seems to be a very 
high level of risk, as Ord acknowledges: “[T]his is not 
a small statistical probability that we must diligently 
bear in mind, like the chance of dying in a car crash, but 
something that could readily occur, like the roll of a die, 
or Russian roulette”.
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Ord’s comparison of the total existential risk befalling 
us in the next 100 years to playing Russian Roulette 
with humanity’s future is an interesting one. It is 
certainly eye-catching and makes for good newspaper 
headlines. On the one hand, it could be seen as a 
useful heuristic to convey the urgency of prioritizing 
existential risk, but on the other hand it also seems one 
that easily lends itself to misinterpretation, for it may 
lead people to under- or over-exaggerate the chance of 
existential risk this century. 
For instance, in the philosophy of risk (a discipline that 
has been growing since the 1970s), it is commonplace to 
distinguish between three conceptions of probabilities: 
1) fact-relative, 2) belief-relative and 3) evidence-
relative. A fact-relative conception considers the risk 
to be facts about the world and is objective insofar it 
is independent of an individual’s belief or evidence. In 
this sense, a 1 in 6 chance of dying in a game of Russian 
Roulette is a fact-relative risk. Belief- and evidence-
relative conceptions, by contrast, consider the risk to 
be a measure of the strength of an agent’s belief or the 
weight of an agent’s evidence. Ord’s estimate of total 
existential risk falls in this latter category. 
Accordingly, the comparison between Ord’s evidence-
relative probability of going extinct this century with 
fact-relative probability of dying in a game of Russian 
Roulette may give the wrong impression that the 
comparison is between two sets of probabilities that are 
both objective, precise and accurate – something Ord 
himself warns us against: “[D]on’t take these numbers 
to be completely objective”. Whether or not we can even 
draw any sensible or meaningful comparison between 
these two conceptions of risk is a difficult question in 
itself. But for now, it suffices to say that readers should 
treat the comparison of total existential risk with 
Russian Roulette to be a metaphorical and not a literal 
one.
We can take the metaphor to suggest that humanity’s 
each and every action (or lack thereof) that increases 
the total risk is akin to someone pulling the trigger on 
us and initiating a causal chain that will hit its target 
one in six times. This follows from our standard way 
of thinking about Russian Roulette cases. With that 
said, one might wonder how exactly this comparison 
is supposed to help us in thinking about mitigating, 
reducing or eliminating different existential risks from 
the risk landscape? Suppose humanity decides to reduce 
the risk of extinction from developments in unaligned 
AI by pulling the plug on the project altogether. Would 
this count as taking out one, two or three bullets out 
of our Existential Russian Roulette? Or is it more? How 
can we tell? 
***
In the last part of his book, Ord moves towards suggesting 
how humanity should move forward. He argues that 
we have a responsibility for ensuring that the bullet 
doesn’t fire. Currently, we spend less than a thousandth 
of a percent of gross world product (GWP) on targeted 
existential risk interventions. Moreover, as has become 
clear from the current (mis)handling of the pandemic, 
we also lack efficient international coordination, as 
well as health and political institutions that are capable 
of tackling not just short-term risks, but also longer-
term existential risks. The challenge for us, then, is to 
prioritise the most important existential risks within 
the global political agenda in order to develop adequate 
strategies for protecting and preserving our long-term 
future. As most existential risks that Ord describes arise 
from human activity, it is entirely within our control how 
we choose to govern, regulate, and control our activities 
to prevent these risks from materialising or worsening. 
As Ord summarises the situation, the choices we are 
going to make will determine “whether we live or die; 
fulfil our potential or squander our chance at greatness”. 
CURRENTLY, WE SPEND 
LESS THAN A THOUSANDTH 
OF A PERCENT OF GROSS 
WORLD PRODUCT ON 
TARGETED EXISTENTIAL RISK 
INTERVENTIONS
So how, then, can we protect our potential? Ord offers 
us the following suggestions for safeguarding humanity. 
First, we need to reach a stage of existential security by 
bringing down existential risks to a sustainable level. 
According to Ord, “existential security is about reducing 
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the total existential risk by as many percentage points 
as possible”. So if we manage to reduce the risk of future 
natural and engineered pandemics substantially as well 
as other risks that are within our control (although it 
remains unclear exactly how did could be done), we can 
soon be “past the stage of standing on a precipice, free 
to contemplate the range of futures that lie open before 
us”. 
IF WE STRIVE TO ACHIEVE 
EXISTENTIAL SECURITY, WE 
CAN IMPROVE THE EXPECTED 
QUALITY OF LIFE OF THOSE 
WHO WOULD COME AFTER US
This brings us to the second stage of Ord’s strategy, 
namely, long reflection. This stage is marked by humanity 
having reached the stage of existential security, and 
finally setting itself the task of finding the “final 
answer to the question of which is the best kind of 
future for humanity”. Ord imagines this idealistic (and 
rather romantic) period of long reflection to be one in 
which discussions about which path humanity should 
set itself onto will occupy the intellectual and public 
forums. Ultimately, the aim of this phase would be to 
steer ourselves in the direction of achieving humanity’s 
full potential, the final stage in Ord’s strategy. 
From the point of view of our current world, one that 
is heavily divided and marked by sharp social, political, 
and cultural disagreements and conflicts, Ord’s stage 
of long reflection sounds like an unimaginable utopia, 
and raises questions like: How are we to strike a balance 
between pursuing this task of protecting our long-
term potential and the task of protecting humanity 
from living in inhospitable conditions characterised 
by hunger, mass migration and shortage of resources? 
How much of our political, economic, and personal 
attention should go into mitigating the proposed 
1 in 10 chance of existential catastrophe posed by 
AGI takeovers in the next hundred years rather than 
making sure humanity thrives in bearable, decent 
living conditions by mitigating risks from starvation, 
poverty, and climate change in the next fifty years?
Perhaps Ord would say that we can pursue these tasks 
together. If we strive to achieve existential security, we 
can improve the expected quality of life of those who 
would come after us. We currently have the advantage 
of being at a very early stage of thinking about the 
long-term future of humanity. We also have the power 
to ensure that humanity can achieve a desirable future. 
And it is now up to us whether or not we choose to 
exercise this power correctly, and, most importantly, at 
the right time. As Ord notes, “through our choices we 
can pull back from the precipice and, in time, create a 
future of astonishing value – with richness of which we 
can barely dream, made possible by innovations we are 
yet to conceive”.
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